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Decreasing Cost of Intermediation
Abdelmounaim Lahrech and Hemant Patil §
May 11, 2005
Abstract
This paper attempts to explain how cost of intermediation can be reduced. One
solution we postulate is subsidizing the cost of intermediation. The model uses ex-ante
identical, spatially separated agents in an overlapping-generations framework. Agents
receive relocation shock when they become old. We conclude that government cannot
subsidize the cost of intermediation completely but it can reduce cost partially.
§ Deaprtment of Economics, Southern Illinois University
1 Introduction
Financial intermediation is a mechanism through which funds are transferred from lenders
(savers) to borrowers. This is conventionally accepted to be a very important function. But
most of the modern macroeconomic theory almost ignores intermediation in that changes in
intermediation activity are presumed to be an outcome of changes in real economic activity.
The strong correlation between financial intermediation and long-run growth has been em-
phasized in the intermediation literature for long time since Gurley and Shaw (1955) first
postulated it. They argued that both real economic activity and financial intermediation
activity influence each other and the causality runs both ways making both endogenous.
But there is a scarcity of any empirical evidence except for few notable exceptions. At this
point it is sufficient to say that financial intermediation is not looked at seriously by the
macroeconomic profession.
This paper clsoely follows Bencivenga and Smith (2003) except in one respect, we allow for
variable cost and later we analyse whether government can subsidise cost of intermediation.
We use overlapping-generations framework with spatial separation and limited communica-
tion between the agents inhabiting the separate locations. We find that government can
bring down the cost of inetrmediation partially.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents the basic framework of the
model. Sections 2,3,4 and 5 analyse the equilibrium in the economy. Section 6 incorporates
the governemnt by allowing it to subsidise the cost of intermediation. Section 7 concludes.
2 The environment
We consider an overlapping generations framework with an infinite sequence of two-period-
lived agents in each period t ≥ 1. There are two locations across which agents are distributed.
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The islands are symmetric in every respect. At each date a continuum of ex-ante identical
agents with unit mass is born at each location.
In each location in each period a single final good is produced with constant returns
to scale technology.The production process uses both labor and capital as inputs. The
production function has the Cobb-Douglas form F (Kt, Lt) = AK
α
t L
1−α
t ,with α ∈ (0, 1).
Letting kt = Kt/Lt,the production function becomes f(kt) = Ak
α
t . Also, we assume that
capital depriciates completely in the production process.
Each agent is endowed with one unit of labor which he supplies inelastically. Agents
only value consumption when they are old. Let ct denote the consumption of agent born at
t. Then the agent has lifetime utility level u(ct) = c
1−ρ/(1 − ρ).All the agents are identical
ex-ante.
Based on Bencivenga and Smith (2003),we assume that at each date an agent can trade
only with agents who live at his current location and there is no communication between
islands. Between dates t and t+1, each agent faces the probability pi ∈ (0, 1)that he will be
relocated to the other island.When agents are relocated, they lose contact with agents agents
in their original location. Agents in their new location do not know the capital holdings of
relocated agents. So, relocated agents need currency in the new location. On the other hand
non-relocated agents have both their capital holdings and currency.Stochastc relocation poses
a risk for agents: they have to convert capital holdings into currency if relocated. They will
require insure to cover against relocatio shock.
Agents can hold two assets: currency and physical capital. Each unit of final good
invested at period t becomes capital at period t+ 1.Capital is immobile. Agents lose all the
capital assets if relocated. We assume that young agents can save through banks. Utilization
of bank is costly. We assume that there are two components of cost of intermediation. There
is a fixed cost and a variable cost which decreases as the savings through banks increase.
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For simplicity, we assume the cost that the agents have to face is (φ − gst), where φ is a
positive fixed cost. There are various ways in which one can justify the decreasing cost
of intermediation. The most plausible arguement, however, in the context of developing
countries is that higher savings makes bank penetration better, reducing the costs associated
with accessing the intermediaries. Agents can also choose to save autarkically. This prevents
them from sharing the relocation risk.
the timing of events is as follows: beginning of the period, production takes place. Rental
rate on capital and wages are disbursed. Agents get the prevailig wage rate as they are
supplying labor inelastically. Agents don’t consume when they are young so they save
everything (their real wage). Agents make two set of choices whether to save the money
autarkically or to save it through banks. If he chooses autarky, he has to decide how to
allocate them between cash and capital assets. If banks are used they make the portfolio
choices. The goods market clear: old agents consume, government makes purchses and final
goods are invested. Later some young agents suffer relocation shock.1The young relocated
agents have to leave the island immediately. They withdraw cash from the banks and leave.
They cannot liquidate the physical capital they hold. Therefore, relocated agents who save
and invest autarkically lose the value of their capital invetsment. Agents who are fortunate to
have escaped the relocation shock do not take any action until the beginning of next period.
Both relocated and non-relocated agents make purchases for consumption when they enter
next period.
Thre is a governmemt in each island which prints money and purchases final good. Let
Mt be the nominal money supply per young agent at t. Mt evolves acoording toMt+1 = σMt,
with σ being chosen once and for all at the beginning of time. Letting pt denote the price
1Note that not all the agents receive the relocation shock but all of them have common prior probability
about the shock.
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level in period t, the seignorage revenue of the government at t is:
(
σ−1
σ
)
Mt
pt
Government uses this money to purchase final good. We consider a case where govern-
ment does not run contractionary policy.
3 Factor Markets
As noted in the previous section the production takes place at the begiinning of period t
and rental rate of capital and wage income is paid. Let wt and rt denote the real wage and
real rate of return on capital.Letting the firms behave competitively gives us following factor
market equilibrium conditions:
rt = f
′(kt) = αAkα−1t (1)
wt = f(kt)− ktf ′(kt) = w(kt) = (1− α)Akαt (2)
4 Economy with Intermediation
As mentioned earlier, when young agents save through banks they incur cost which is a
decreasing function of their saving. Since agents save all the income through intermediaries
the cost of intermediation will be (φ−gwt). So, effectively they deposit [wt(1+g)−φ] in the
bank.Banks,in turn, assure them gross real return of ct if they are relocated and gross real
return of at for per unit of the final good deposited, if they are not relocated.
2Banks allocate
2Relocated agents are withdrawing early and non-relocated agents are withdrawing late.
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their deposits between currency holdings and capital investment before the relocation shock
occurs. Let γbt be the fraction of total deposits held as currency and (1−γbt) be the fraction
of total deposits invested in capital assets. A bank chooses reserve to deposit raio (γbt) to
maximize the expected utility of the representative depositor. The bank faces the following
constraints:
pict ≤ γbt
(
pt
pt+1
)
(3)
The left hand side of this constraint is the expected cost of the bank where pi is the
probability of receiving the relocation shock. And the right hand side is the retuns that the
bank gets from holding currency. Note that bank has to hold cash assets in order to pay to
the relocated agent.And pt/pt+1 is simply the gross real rate return of currency.
(1− pi)at ≤ (1− γbt)rt+1 (4)
The left hand side is again the expected returns that have to be paid to the non-relocated
depositor and right hand side is the returns that bank gets from investment in capital assets.
The prices and real rate of return on capital are decided in goods and factor markets
respectively. For bank they are exogenous. Then the bank’s problem is to maximize expected
utility of the depositor by choosing γbt, ct and dt. More specifically, bank solves the following
problem:
max
γbt
(wt(1 + g)− φ)
1− ρ
[
pi(ct)
1−ρ + (1− pi)(at)1−ρ
]
(5)
subject to the constraints (3) and (4) and non-negativity.
Defining gross nominal interest rate It = rt+1(pt+1/pt), the optimal reserve-to-deposit
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ratio of a bank at time t is3 :
γbt =
1(
1−pi
pi
)
I
(1−ρ)/ρ
t + 1
≡ γb(It) (6)
We can now derive the returns that bank can can offer to relocated and non-relocated
agents using (3),(4)and (6). More specifically, at = I
1
ρ
t ct will be the optimum return. When
the nominal interest rate is It > 1, the relocated agent does worse than the non-relocated
agent. Bencivenga and Smith(2003)various properties of the functionγb(I), we are simply
restating those properties here:
(a)γb(I) = pi
(b)lim I →∞ = 0
(c)
Iγ′b(I)
γb(I)
= −
(
1−ρ
ρ
)
[1− γb(I)] < 0
Several important conclusions can be drawn from these properties. First of all setting nomi-
mal interest rate equal to unity will not make agents (through banks)to hol only currency.
Finally, the last property shows that increase in nominal interest will cause banks to move
away from holding currency.
5 Equilibrium with Intermediated Saving
Let us first look at the money market. Banks will want to hold a fraction(γb) of their total
deposits in the form of currency. This gives us the per capita demand for real balances. The
money market will clear if
Mt
pt
= mt = γb(It) (w(kt) [1 + g]− φ) (7)
3Bencivenga and Smith(2003) derive the same expression for γbt with fixed cost of intermediation.
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Given that banks will hold rest of their total deposits (1 − γbt)in capital assets, we get
the following per capita rate of capital accumulation
kt+1 = [1− γb(It)] [w(kt) (1 + g)− φ] (8)
Following condition determines the evolution of gross nominal interest rate.As defined
previously,
It = rt+1
(
pt+1
pt
)
= rt+1σ
(
mt
mt+1
)
(9)
Substituting (1) and (7) into (9) gives
It =
σf ′(kt+1)γb(It) [w(kt)(1 + g)− φ]
γb(It+1 [w(kt(1 + g)− φ)]) (10)
or,
γ(It+1) =
σf ′(kt+1)γb(It)
It
≡ Ω(kt+1, kt, It) (11)
This completes our discussion of equilibrium.
6 steady state
The steadys state solution will have It = It+1 = I and kt = kt+1 = k. Substituting it in (10)
gives
I = σf ′(k) (12)
which implies
k =
(
σαA
I
)1/(1−α)
(13)
Now we can express the amount deposited in the bank as
w(k)[1 + g]− φ = (1− α)(1 + g)A
(
σαA
I
)α/(1−α)
(14)
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Substituting (14) into (8) and using other conditions we get
1
1− γb(I) = (1 + g)
(
1− α
α
)(
I
σ
)
− ν
(
I
σ
)
≡ H(I) (15)
where ν = φ(αA)1/(1−α). Again, we restate the properties of the function H(I) from Ben-
civenga and Smith (2003) with some obvious variations.4
(a′) H ′(I) holds if and only if
I ≤ σ
[
(1−α)2(1+g)
αν
](1−α)/α
≡ Iˆ
(b′) H(I) ≥ 0 holds if and only if
[
(1−α)(1+g)
α
](1−α)/α
≥ I
(c′) H(I) is a concave function of I.
These properties will yield the steady state solutions which are discussed in detail Bencivenga
and Smith (2003).
7 Subsidized Intermediation
Till this point we have largely followed Bencivenga and Smith(2003). We know that the
cost of intermediation has fixed and variable component. Now we argue that governemnt
subsidises the agent by making a lumpsum transfer equal to φ while he receives his real wage.
Note that we are now allowing only fixed cost of intermediation. We consider two cases. In
the first case, government subsidises the agent completely by making a trasfer equal to the
4The properties of H(I) are slightly different as we use the variable costs.
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fixed cost he has to incur in order to save through bank. While in other case government
subsidises the agent by offsetting only a fraction of fixed cost.
7.1 Complete Subsidization
In this case we assume that government uses all its seignorage revenue to subsidise a repre-
setative agent who incurs the fixed cost of going to bank. This will imply
w(kt)g =
(
σ − 1
σ
)
Mt
pt
= φ (16)
Given the above balanced budget constraint, government can solve for σ or the money growth
rate which offsets the fixed cost of intermediation. We get
σ =
mt
mt− φ =
Mt
Mt − φPt < 1∀φ > 0 (17)
Since pt is subject to change in every time period, we will violate the condition that σ is
constant. Even if we relax the constant σ assumption, we still have to deal with a deflationary
situation.The nominal inetrest rate will be less than one and most importantly since at =
I
1/ρ
t ct, the non-relocated agents will have to suffer. Hence, complete subsidization is not
feasible.
7.2 Partial Subsidization
Now we look at the situation whether government can offset the fixed cost partially. Here we
assume that governemnt does not try to set σ to offset cost but simply passes on whatever
seignorage revenue it makes given a predetermined value of σ. This will imply that govern-
ment will be able to reduce some of the fixed cost. The exact amout of deposit made by
agent will be then
[
w(kt) +
(
σ−1
σ
)
mt − φ
]
. The new money market equilibrium will be
mt =
γb(It) [w(kt)− φ]
1− γb(It)
(
σ−1
σ
) (18)
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Also, the evolution of gross nominal interest rate will change. We get
It = σf
′(kt)
(
γb(It) [w(kt)− φ]
1− γb(It)
(
σ−1
σ
) )( 1− γb(It+1) (σ−1σ )
γb(It+1) [w(kt+1)− φ]
)
(19)
The currency-to-deposit ratio will be
γb(It+1) =
σf ′(kt+1)γb(It)
[
w(kt) +
(
σ−1
σ
)
mt − φ
]
It
[
w(kt+1) +
(
σ−1
σ
)
mt+1 − φ
] (20)
The steady state value of gross nominal interest rate will remain unchanged. Here increas-
ing the growt rate of money will increase capital stock and output as in Bencivenga and
Smith(2003).5 However, one can set σ in such a way that it rules out the bad steady state.
8 Conclusion
It is often remarked that in developing countries low level of intermediation is caused due
to high cost of intermediation. The argument is based on the lack of penetration of banking
activity. Here we presented a case where the cost of intermediation can be subsidised by the
government. Also, we analysed the case where cost of intermediation is a decraesing function
of the amount of savings.
There are various directions in which the present analysis can be extende. One important
issue is why do the banks hold excess reserves of currency when the required reserve level is
low. This issue is important even in case of developed countries. One can also try a more
sophisticated game-theoretic approach to analyse this. There is also the possibilty that both
agents and banks receive exogenous shocks. The issue of why agents only deposit a fraction
of their income in the banks is also important.
5Their results are restricted to only certain steady states
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